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Abstract:   This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of economic 
performance through time.  The model incorporates 4 main determinants of economic 
performance: technology, capital investment, the division of labor and institutions.   It 
demonstrates that growth is not automatic even with technological progress.  In order 
to maintain economic growth, it is important to continuously implement new 
technologies through capital investment.  It also shows that institutional improvement 
promotes the social division of labour, which is an independent source of economic 
growth.   
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Economic Performance Through Time:  




Both exogenous and endogenous (including the semi-endogenous varieties) models 
rightly identify technological progress as the most important driver of long-term 
economic growth.  The main difference between the two types of models is that the 
former e.g., Solow (1956) does not explain technology progress, but instead takes it as 
something determined by forces outside of the models.   In contrast, the latter 
provides a theory on why or how technology advances take place Barro (1997).  For 
example, Arrow (1962) points to learning by doing as a source of productivity 
improvement.  Others suggest that the discovery of new technologies depends on 
purposive R&D activities Aghion and Howitt (1992, Grossman and Helpman (1991, 
Jones (1995, Romer (1987, (1990).   
 
However, technological progress by itself is unlikely to sustain long-term economic 
growth for several reasons.   
 
First of all, technologies are typically embodied in capital goods, and new 
technologies often require new types of capital goods Landes (1969).  Since the 
implementation of new technologies requires capital investment, it may be that it is 
capital rather than technological advance per se is the binding constraint on economic 
growth.   Indeed, according to Hicks (1969), the most notable achievement during 
early periods of the Industrial Revolution was the manufacturing of many products 
that had been invented much earlier, and a main cause of delay in commercialising 
these inventions was the lack of capital.  The link between growth and investment in 
capital goods (especially equipments) in recent times has been emphasised by De 
Long and Summers (1991, (1992). 
 
Moreover, the discovery and implementation of new technologies requires a good 
institutional environment.  On the one hand, as the work of North and Thomas (1973), 
Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) and North (1990) demonstrates, historically rapid 
technological progress and capital accumulation tended to take place in countries with  
good institutions including formal rules, informal norms and enforcement 
characteristics.  On the other hand, the dismal returns from most foreign aid to third 
world countries suggest that without good institutions, technology and capital cannot 
bring growth miracles Bauer (1976). 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the implementation of new technologies does not occur in 
isolation; it is intimately related to the level of the social division of labor.   As is well 
known, Adam Smith (1776) considered the division of labor to be the mainspring of 
productivity improvement.  Smith also explicitly pointed out that a key benefit of the 
division of labor is that it facilitates the use of machines that complements with 
specialized labor, which suggests that the division of labor tends to facilitate the 
implementation of new technologies.  In fact, the causation also runs the other way, 
that is, the implementation of new technologies tends to facilitate further division of 
labor.  This is because new technologies introduce new products or better ways of 
producing existing products, both increasing the scope for further division of labor.    
 
Thus in our view, while technological advance is an important factor behind 
economic growth, it has to work with other factors to realise its potential.  The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of technological progress, 
capital investment, favourable institutional environment and the division of labor on 
economic growth.   In doing so, we construct a simple general equilibrium model of 
economic performance through time.  The model demonstrates that growth is not 
automatic even with technological progress.  In order to maintain economic growth, it 
is important to continuously implement new technologies through capital investment 
It also shows that institutional improvement promotes the social division of labour, 
which is an independent source of economic growth.   
.   
We present our model in the following section, and discuss its results and implications 
in section 3.  Section 4 concludes.  
  
2. The model 
2.1 Setup of the model 
Consider an economy with many ex ante identical individuals who derive utility from 
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The final good, Z, can be produced with either labor (l) alone or a combination of 
labor and a capital good, net (N).  N is produced with labor only.  There are thus 3 
different tasks:  
(1) producing Z with labor 
(2) producing N 
(3) producing Z with labor and N. 
There is a cost to learn each task.  The learning cost is incurred only once if an 
individual continues to perform one task.  If he switches between tasks, then he has to 
re-learn each time he switches to a different task.  For simplicity, learning cost is 
assumed to be equal to a faction (1-s) of total labor input.  Each individual is assumed 
to be endowed with L units of labor per period. 
 
The two technologies are described by the following production functions: 
(1) With learning costs: 
Z sl =   
o r        
min( , ) Z As l N = , and  Ns l =         
(2) Without learning cost 
Z l =   
o r        
min( , ) Z Al N = , and  Nl =   
The second (capital-using) technology is more productive than the first technology.  
  
An individual chooses a production technology and decides whether or not to engage 
in specialisation.  The aggregate of all individual choices results in 3 different 
structures as illustrated in Figure 1. 
[insert figure 1 here] 
 
We discuss the features of each structure below. 
 
(1) Structure A: Autarky with no capital goods. 
In this structure, all individuals choose to fish with labor only; no capital good is used, 
no trade takes place.  An individual’s utility over the infinite is determined by 










(2) Structure B: Autarky with capital goods 
In this structure, each individual catches fish in period 1 with labor only.  The 
individuals consume half of the catch in period 1, and save the rest for consumption in 
period 2.
1    In period 2, the individual makes nets which are used together with labor 
to fish in period 3.  For simplicity, N is assumed to be completely depreciated after 
one period.  So in Period 4, the individuals make N again for use in period 5.  The 2-
period Net-making – fishing cycle repeats itself from period 2 onwards.  Since the 
individuals perform a different task each period, they have to incur a learning cost 
each period.  The individuals’ consumption pattern over time is characterised as 
follows: 
12
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(3) Structure C: Division of labor with capital goods 
                                                 
1 Alternative we can assume that the individual saves the minimum amount required to sustain life for 
the period when he makes N.  However this assumption generates an oscillating consumption pattern 
and complicates computation without adding much to illuminating the main thesis of the paper.   
In this structure, half of the individuals specialise in fishing, the other half specialise 
in making nets.   In period 1, fishermen fish with labor only.  They consume some and 
sell the rest to Net-makers in exchange of nets at the end of period 1.  In period 2, 
fishermen use N and labor to produce , and exchange with net makers at the end of the 
period to replace the nets that have been completely depreciated.  This production and 
trade pattern repeats itself from period 2 onwards.  
 
We assume that there is a transaction cost associated with market exchange.   
Transaction costs are not simply transportation costs, but include the costs of 
information, of specifying and enforcing contracts.  An important determinant of the 
level of transaction costs is the quality of institutions.  For instance, market exchange 
typically requires the development of institutional structures that permit individuals to 
have confidence in dealing with strangers.  How costly the transactions will be if they 
take place at all depends on the extent to which market participants can rely on the 
establishment of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and the existence of norms 
to constrain opportunistic behaviour of parties North (1987).  For simplicity, we 
assume that only the net-maker incurs the transaction cost directly, and the transaction 
cost takes the “ice-berg” form.  That is, for every unit of fish the net-maker buys, a 
fraction, k, ( 1 k ≤ ) is lost in transit, only (1-k) unit is left for consumption.    Thus the 
net-maker’s consumption in period 1 is  
1 1 ksLP Z
c
n =  
where P1 is the price of net relative to fish, k is the transaction efficiency coefficient, s 
is the fraction of labor devoted to fish after learning cost has been incurred. 
 
The fisherman’s period 1 consumption is 
sL P sL Z
c
f 1 1 − =  
 
From period 2 onwards, fish is caught with nets, thus 
sAL N l A Z = × = ) , min( 1 2  
where s denotes both the fraction of labor devoted to making nets and the fraction of 
labor devoted to fishing with nets, after learning costs have been incurred. 
 
The fisherman’s and the net-maker’s consumption per period are, respectively  
=
c
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Since all individuals are assumed to be ex ante identical and the choice to specialise in 
either profession is free, the utility of the fisherman and that of the net-maker equalise 
in equilibrium.  From the utility equalisation condition we obtain the equilibrium 
utility for each individual in Structure C, which is: 

















Table 1 summarises individuals’ consumption patterns and utility levels for each 
structure. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.2 Equilibrium 
The general equilibrium structure is the structure that no individuals have an incentive 
to move away from.  This means in our model that the general equilibrium structure is 
the structure that gives the highest level of individual utility.   Thus,  
Structure A is the general equilibrium structure iff  
UA> UB and UA> UC 
Structure B is the general equilibrium structure iff 
UB> UA and UB> UC 
Structure C is the general equilibrium structure iff  
UC> UA and UC> UB 
 
The above conditions define the parameter subsets within which different structures 
emerge as the general equilibrium structure.  These conditions are summarized in 
Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
From Table 2, we can make a number of observations. 
  
First, Structure A is likely to emerge in general equilibrium if individuals have strong 
time preference, i.e., if β  is small.   In other words, if individuals are very impatient, 
they are likely to consume all their present goods, and do not engage in savings or 
capital formation.   
 
Second, Structure B and Structure C are likely to emerge in general equilibrium if 
individuals’ time preference is sufficiently weak.  Whether Structure B or Structure C 
will emerge in general equilibrium depends importantly on the trade-off between the 
benefit from the division of labor and transaction costs.  In our model, the benefits 
from the division of labor come from two sources.  First, as individuals do not switch 
between tasks, the production of final goods is continuous, and the cost of re-learning, 
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That is, the higher the learning costs, the higher the benefits of the division of labor, 
and the more likely Structure C will emerge in equilibrium.  Second, the division of 
labor enables earlier use of the capital-using technology.  In Structure C, capital goods 
are used from period 2.  In Structure B where the division of labor is absent, capital 
goods are not used until period 3.   The benefit of earlier capital utilization is greater if 
individuals have strong time preference, thus ceteris paribus, Structure C is more 
likely to be the general equilibrium structure than structure C when β  is small, as can 
be shown that  UB< UC, if   
2(1 ) ( 1)
[ (1 )( 1) 2(1 ) ] (1 )( 1) 2(1 )
kLs A sL k
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The cost of the division of labor is the transaction costs associated with market 
exchange.  If transaction costs are large (i.e., k is small), then structure B will be more 
likely to be the general equilibrium structure than Structure C.  By rewriting the above 
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In the extreme case where k=1, it is straightforward to show that Structure C always 
produces higher real income than Structure B.  
 
Summarizing the above observations, we have 
Proposition 1.    (1) If individual time preference is sufficiently weak, the general 
equilibrium structure will involve capital formation and capital use.  (2) The general 
equilibrium structure is more likely to involve the division of labor if the cost of 
learning and relearning is high and if transaction efficiency is high.  
 
3. Discussion 
In our model, technologies are exogenously given, however technological progress is 
not entirely exogenous.  Since the more advanced technology is embodied in the 
capital good, N, technological progress only takes place when individuals choose to 
save and engage in capital accumulation.  For example, if Structure A is the general 
equilibrium structure, new technology is available but not adopted for lack of capital, 
and the economy stagnates as a result.   Thus our model illustrates that advances in 
technology alone do not automatically generate economic growth. 
 
Economic growth in our model can occur within a structure, and the sources of 
growth are learning and the adoption of new technology embodied in capital.  Within 
Structure A, growth only occurs in period 2 as a result of learning in period 1.  Within 
Structure B, growth occurs in period 3 as a result of adoption of new technology.  
Within Structure C, growth occurs in period 2 as a result of adoption of new 
technology, and in period 3 as a result of learning (to use the new technology in 
period 2).   
 
Economic growth can also be driven by structural changes. Structural change in our 
model occurs as a result of changes in exogenous variables such as indiviudals’ time 
preference, learning costs, and transaction costs.   To illustrate, suppose given a set of 
parameters at the beginning of period 1, the general equilibrium structure is Structure 
A.  If in time n (n>2), individual time preference has weakened then the equilibrium 
structure may shift to Structure B.  This is because given the changed preference, 
accumulated individual utility from period n onward in Structure A is  
L L L










And the accumulated individual utility from period n onwards in Structure B is  
2 2 2
(
2 1 AsL L L n β β β + +
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An individual gains a higher utility level in Structure B from n period onwards if 





.  Similarly, if starting from 
Structure B, after m (m>3) periods transaction efficiency improves such that 
k >




  then the general equilibrium structure will shift to Structure C.   
As discussed earlier, the level of transaction costs depends on the quality of   
institutional environment, especially the extent to which the institutions protects 
property rights and limits the individuals’ opportunistic behaviour when participating 
in market exchange.   Our model shows that if institutional quality improves so as to 
lower transaction costs (i.e., increase transaction efficiency) to a threshold level, 
economic structure can change which leads to social division of labor and higher per 
capita real income.  This result is consistent with the finding of North and Wallis 
(1994) that institutional change and falling transaction costs were a significant source 
of economic growth over the last two centuries.  
 
Notably within our model long-term growth does not occur.  This may be thought as a 
weakness of the model.  However in our view, long-term economic growth inevitably 
comes with continuous structural change – even in the case of a single final good, 
different technologies typically mean different capital goods, different lengths of the 
production chain and different specialists and structures of production.  It is extremely 
difficult if not impossible to predict structrual changes because the path of change is 
not smooth, but is instead characterised by discontinous shifts at irregular intervals.  
Hence, instead of attempting to model long-term growth, our model has a much more 
modest goal of illustrating elements of the growth process.  In particular it shows that 
long-term growth requires continuous implementation of better technologies, which 
requires capital investment.  It also highlights the importance of institutional change 







In this paper we have presented a simple model that links four main drivers of 
economic growth: technological progress, capital investment, division of labor and 
institutions.   It shows that the benefits of new technologies are realize through capital 
investment, and that by promoting the division of labor, improvement in institutions 
can lead to better economic performance. 
 
A noteworthy technical feature of our model is that it explicitly describes the 
production process through time and characterises different economic structures.   
Given the temporal aspect of production, individuals must produce before they can 
consume and save.  They must save before capital goods can be made which embody 
new technology, and the return on their investment is realised after the final goods 
have been produced.   The multiple economic structures mean that for a pre-existing 
set of parameters at the beginning of period 1, our model predicts that a corresponding 
structure will be the general equilibrium structure with its own path of economic 
performance.  If parameters change over time, the general equilibrium structure will 
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Table 1. Consumption patterns and utility levels 
 
  Structure A  Structure B  Structure C 
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